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INTRODUCTION
Between 2015 and 2020, the U.S. Government won or negotiated
more than $16.4 billion from litigation arising from the False Claims
Act (“FCA”).1 Of this staggering reward, approximately eighty percent
 J.D. candidate, May 2022, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A. in Chemistry, emphasis in Biochemistry, May 2018, Pepperdine
University. The author would like to thank his professor, Hal Morris, teaching
assistant, Erin Monforti, and student editors, Samantha McHugh, and Andrew
White, for their guidance and support throughout the editing process.
1 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006); Justice Department Recovers Over $4.6
Billion From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016; Justice Department Recovers Over $3.7 Billion
From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2017 (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017; Justice Department Recovers Over $2.8 Billion
From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018 (Dec. 21, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-28-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2018; Justice Department Recovers Over $3 Billion
From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-3-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2019; Justice Department Recovers Over $2.2 Billion
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of cases were brought to the attention of the government by
whistleblowers 2 (referred to as “relators” in the context of the FCA)
who put the government on notice of alleged fraudulent conduct.
Relators hold a pivotal role in FCA litigation by providing the
government information related to individuals or entities who have
defrauded it through filing a qui tam action with the court that describes
the fraudulent conduct with detail.3 These complaints are filed under
seal for at least sixty days4 to give the government adequate time to
investigate and determine whether it will intervene in the case.5 If the
government declines to intervene, the relator becomes responsible for
litigating the case on behalf of the government, and the defendant is
notified of the filed suit.6
Relators are incentivized to file FCA actions and proceed in
litigation because they are entitled to anywhere between 15–25% of the
overall reward (as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs)
should they be successful. 7 This monetary incentive has proven its
efficacy through many successful recoveries for the government. In the
year 2020 alone, the DOJ recovered $1.69 billion from qui tam lawsuits
where it recovered only $545 million in litigation arising without a
relator’s involvement.8 While qui tam actions are significant to the
DOJ’s annual FCA recovery, they have led to conflict where the

From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2020 (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-22-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2020 [hereinafter DOJ Recovery Press Releases].
2 See Fraud Statistics-Overview Oct. 1, 1986 - Sept. 30, 2020 (January 14,
2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1354316/download (reporting
that from 2016 to 2020, whistleblowers brought 3,347 of 4,168 new FCA matters).
3 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (requiring “A copy of the complaint and written
disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information the person
possesses shall be served on the Government).
4
Id.
5 Id.
6 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3).
7 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)
8 See Fraud Statistics-Overview Oct. 1, 1986 – Sept. 30, 2020, supra note 2.
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government and relator disagree on whether an ongoing FCA suit led
by a relator should be dismissed.9
Before this issue reached the Seventh Circuit, the other circuits
developed two competing approaches—the Sequoia and Swift
standards.10 The Ninth Circuit first heard the issue in United States ex
rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., and created a
standard requiring the government to have a rationally related reason
for dismissing a relator’s qui tam action.11 Five years later, the D.C.
declined to follow this standard in its ruling of Swift v. United States, ,
adopting a rule that granted the government an “unfettered right” to
dismiss any FCA action—including when it is against the relator’s
wishes.12 As discussed below in Part II, these standards are both
erroneous in their reasoning and application. The Sequoia standard
grants the government too little control where the Swift standard grants
too much.
In 2020, seventeen years after Sequoia, the Seventh Circuit
attempted to merge the two standards into one hybrid approach in its
ruling of United States ex rel. Cimznhca v. UCB, Inc.13 The Seventh
Circuit established a standard that “lies much nearer to Swift than
Sequoia,”14 in finding that the government has an unfettered right to
dismiss an FCA action without cause prior to the defendants filing an
answer or motion for summary judgment, and after this point, must have
a rationally related reason for doing so. 15
9

See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (authorizing the government to dismiss an
FCA action when they notify the relator, and the court provides a hearing on the
motion).
10 Compare U.S. ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp.,
151 F.3d 1139, 1147 (9th Cir. 1998)) (holding there must be a rational basis for the
government’s dismissal); with Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (holding the Government has an “unfettered right” to dismiss any FCA actions
filed by relators).
11
151 F.3d at 1145.
12 318 F.3d at 253.
13 970 F.3d 835, 850–51 (7th Cir. 2020)
14 Id. at 840.
15 Id. at 850.
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The Seventh Circuit took a creative approach to resolving the issue
but erred, like its sister courts, in failing to appropriately weigh the
interests of the government against those of the relator when granting
dismissal. While the court crafted a solution that conforms to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the result extra-statutory deference to
relators—something the Seventh Circuit sought to resolve.
While this topic may seem inconsequential on its face, its
implications can easily be hypothesized in times where the government
disburses much aid. For example, in the first eighteen months of the
COVID-19 pandemic, the government allotted $4.5 trillion in relief to
Americans.16 Further, just over a year into the pandemic, the DOJ had
reported 474 criminal indictments for false claims totaling over $569
million.17 The fraud from these crucial government relief programs had
run rampant. These funds were spent on a variety of expenses not related
to their purpose, including two new shiny Lamborghinis for two men
from Florida18 and Texas19 respectively. With such rampant fraud
continuing through the early 2020s, and with qui tam actions remaining
prevalent in the government’s recoveries, clear rules must be established
that appropriately balance the interests of the government and the
relators alike.
This Note argues that all three standards are incorrect in their
failure to adequately consider the purpose of the False Claims Act. The

16COVID-19

Spending, USASpending.gov, (Sep. 30, 2021),
https://www.usaspending.gov/disaster/covid-19?publicLaw=all
17 Justice Department Takes Action Against COVID-19 Fraud, (March 26,
2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-takes-action-againstcovid-19-fraud.
18 See Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Florida Man Who
Used COVID-Relief Funds to Purchase Lamborghini Sports Car Charged in Miami
Federal Court (July 27, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/florida-man-whoused-covid-relief-fundspurchase-lamborghini-sports-car-charged-miami-federal
19 See Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Texas Entrepreneur
Charged with Spending COVID Relief Funds on Improper Expenses Including
Lamborghini and Strip Club (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/texasentrepreneur-charged-spendingcovid-relief-funds-improper-expenses-including.
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Sequoia standard20 incentivizes the filing of frivolous litigation through
its more demanding standard for the government to explain their
reasoning to the relator. Conversely, the Swift standard21 places too little
emphasis on the relator’s interest, departing from the text of the FCA in
giving relators a pointless hearing where their objections do not have to
be considered. The Seventh Circuit is likely the closest to adopting an
optimal standard,22 however it similarly failed to appropriately weigh
the interests of the government against those of the relator when
granting dismissal in its failure to allow for the relator’s objection to be
considered in early stages of litigation.
This Note includes four parts. Part I provides historical context of
the FCA and provides an overview of the Government’s right to dismiss
FCA qui tam lawsuits. Part II provides an analysis of the rules adopted
by the circuits that have reached this issue. Part III provides
commentary on District Court for the Southern District of Illinois and
the Seventh Circuit decisions in United States v. UCB. arguing that the
Seventh Circuit erred in finding that the government must disclose its
reasons to the relator on why it is dismissing the case at any stage of
litigation. Finally, Part IV argues for a proposed solution that
appropriately weighs the interests of both the relator and the
government.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. The Qui Tam Provision of the False Claims Act
The FCA23 is a federal statute that forbids an individual or entity
from presenting “false or fraudulent claim[s] for payment or approval”
to the U.S. Government.24 This statute grants the government a right to
recover the funds disbursed to any individual or entity that submitted
20

U.S. ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d
1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 1998).
21 Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
22 See U.S. ex rel CIMZNHCA, LLC v UCB, Inc., 970 F.3d at 850–51.
23 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733
24 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)
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the false claim and provides grounds for the government to prosecute
them criminally.25
The FCA originated in the Civil War era as a response to
widespread fraud against the Union which harmed its military forces.26
At the time of the FCA’s enactment, the Union Army was suffering
incredible losses due to American contractors providing the Federal
Government with faulty supplies—including rifles, ammunition, and
food.27 Given the importance of the Government’s interest in delivering
adequate supplies to its soldiers, Congress enacted the FCA as a means
to for the Government to recover damages against those attempting to
defraud it.28 While rooted in historical circumstances, this statute has
since developed into the Federal Government’s “primary litigation tool
for combatting fraud.”29
The False Claims Act remained untouched until 1943 when
Congress amended the Act to cut successful relators’ rewards
significantly to disincentivize the filing of frivolous FCA claims.30 In
the 1986, Congress amended the Act once again—which formed the
basis of the substance in the modern FCA—changing the relators’
award, this time entitling a successful relator to 15–30% of the
government’s recovery and attorneys’ fees.31 This reward was
dependent on government intervention. 32 If the government intervened,
then the relator could receive between fifteen and twenty-five percent
25

Id.
Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 (2000).
27 Id.
28 See 3 GUSTAVUS MYER, HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES
(1910) (quoting Lincoln after the passage of the first FCA in 1863, “[w]orse than
traitors in arms are the men, pretending loyalty to the flag, who feast and fatten on
the misfortunes of the nation, while patriotic blood is crimsoning the plains of the
south, and their countrymen are moldering in the dust.”)
29 U.S. ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 267 (5th
Cir. 2010).
30 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (Supp. III 1943), 57 Stat. 608 (1943).
31 U.S. ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649–51
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (explaining substance of 1986 amendments).
32 31 USC § 3730(d)(1)–(2).
26
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of the reward whereas if the government did not intervene, the reward
would increase to between twenty-five and thirty percent.33 After the
1986 amendment, and with an increased portion of the overall reward
awaiting relators, there was an influx of qui tam suits filed leading to
widespread success in recovering fraudulently claimed government
funds.34
The DOJ reclaims an incredible sum of money from fraudulent
disbursements due to relators putting it on notice of fraud, the success
rate for relators largely depends on its intervention which only occurs
twenty-two percent of the time.35 Of the cases in the DOJ intervenes,
about ninety-five percent result in a recovery for the government.36
Conversely, only about six percent of the seventy-eight percent of cases
the government does not intervene in are successful.37 These statistics
are somewhat problematic, despite the ever-increasing number of filed
qui tam actions the rate of intervention has remained largely stagnant.38
With such a great incentive for relators to litigate on the government’s
behalf (and with its intervention), the DOJ has recognized that it needs
to better serve the public by monitoring the cases it does not intervene
in to defend against frivolous lawsuits. 39
The interests of the government and relator are often at odds and the
Supreme Court has repeatedly denied granting certiorari to clarify the
many differing interpretations of the FCA among the circuits.40
Without pivotal guidance, the circuit courts are left at odds with one
another in their attempts to interpret the Act, including the unresolved
33

Id.
See supra note 2.
35 Michael Rich, Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Encouraging the Department of
Justice to Rein in Out-of-Control Qui Tam Litigation Under the Civil False Claims
Act, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1263 (2008).
36 David Kwok, Evidence from the False Claims Act: Does Private
Enforcement Attract Excessive Litigation?, 42 PUB. CONTRACT L. J. 225, 240 (2013).
37 See Rich, supra note 26, at 1263-64.
38 See Granton, supra note 10.
39 Id.
40 Id.
34
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questions presented in UCB.41 Before reaching the various standards
between the circuits, it is first important to understand why the
government often seeks dismissal in these cases.
B. The Government’s Motivation for Seeking Dismissal
The issue at the heart of this Note revolves around when, how, and
for what purpose the government may choose to dismiss a qui tam
lawsuit arising under the FCA. 42 Section 3730(c)(2)(A) of the FCA
explains that the government may seek dismissal—notwithstanding a
relator’s objections—so long as (1) the relator has been notified of the
motion, and (2) the court has provided the relator with a hearing on the
motion.43 The circuits that have reached this issue have all approached
this section with contrasting interpretations, and none have fully hit the
mark.44
This issue was somewhat elusive until the year 2018, when a leaked
memorandum from the Director of the Civil Division’s Fraud Section,
Michael Granston, was formally adopted by the DOJ (the “Granston
Memo”).45 The Granston Memo encouraged DOJ attorneys to take an
active step in seeking dismissals of frivolous lawsuits and offered
several reasons to do so.46 These motivations include:
41

See, e.g., Michael Murray, Note, Seeking More Scienter: The Effect of False
Claims Act Interpretations, 117 YALE L.J. 981, 982-84 (2008) (discussing the circuit
split regarding implied certification in relation to the FCA); Joel D. Hesch, Restating
the “Original Source Exception” to the False Claims Act's “Public Disclosure Bar”
in Light of the 2010 Amendments, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 991, 994 (2017) (discussing
the circuit split regarding the original source exception to the public disclosure bar);
Brief for Cochise Consultancy as Amicus Curiae, p. 2, Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v.
United States, 2019 WL 157807 (U.S.) (discussing the circuit split on applying the
FCA’s statute of limitations).
42 See generally UCB, 970 F.3d 835.
43 28 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
44 See discussion infra Part II.
45 MICHAEL D. GRANSTON, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., FACTORS FOR EVALUATING
DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO 31 U.S.C. 3730(C)(2)(A) (2018) (hereinafter Granston
Memo).
46 See generally id.
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1. “Curbing Meritless Qui Tams;”47
2. “Preventing Parasitic or Opportunistic Qui Tam Actions;”48
3. “Preventing Interference with Agency Policies and
Programs;”49
4. “Controlling Litigation Brought on Behalf of the United
States;”50
5. “Safeguarding Classified Information and National Security
Interests;”51
6. “Preserving Government Resources;”52 and
7. “Addressing Egregious Procedural Efforts.”53
Granston articulated the policy threading these reasons as “[dismissal
authority] remains an important tool to advance the government’s
interests, preserve limited resources, and avoid adverse precedent.”54
This non-exhaustive list highlights the government’s interests in
preventing some qui tam lawsuits, and gives explicit information on
why the government should be making these decisions. 55 The
government in these instances would have a reasonable articulable
understanding of why they are moving for a suit to be dismissed, and
because the government is the true injured party in these actions, should
be able to make dismissals at their discretion.
The Granston memo proved to be effective. Since the passing of
the modern FCA and prior to the Granston memo, the government had
moved to dismiss only forty-five of over 12,500 filed qui tam actions.56
47

Id. at p.3.
Id. at p.4.
49 Id.
50 Id. at p.5.
51 Id. at p.6.
52 Id.
53 Id. at p.7.
54 Id. at p.2.
55 Id. at pp.2-7
56 See Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Ethan P. Davis delivers
remarks on the False Claims Act at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for
Legal Reform (June 26, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/civil/speech/principal48
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In the two years following the Granston Memo, the government made
about fifty motions to dismiss.57 With the dramatic spike in government
dismissals, the issue surrounding § 3730(c)(2)(A) has started to make
prima facie appearances in the circuit courts as recently as October
2021,58 and at least three cases remain pending appeal from district
courts in the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits.59
II.

THE SEQUOIA AND SWIFT STANDARDS

As discussed above, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in UCB was
issued amidst a preexisting circuit split.60 This Part will analyze the
holdings of each respective case and offer commentary on issues
arising under each standard.
A. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Sunland Packing House
The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit court to rule on the issue
of governmental dismissal of FCA actions in 1998.61 The Sequoia
Orange Company filed thirty-four qui tam actions against many of its

deputy-assistant-attorney-general-ethan-p-davis-delivers-remarks-false-claims; see
also Fraud Statistics-Overview Oct. 1, 1986 - Sept. 30, 2020, supra note 3.
57 Id.
58 See U.S. ex rel CIMZNHCA, LLC v UCB, Inc., 970 F.3d at 850–51.; see
also Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 422 F.Supp.3d 916 (3d Cir. Oct. 28, 2021)
(holding that the standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit in UCB was the
appropriate standard in interpreting government dismissals under § 3730(c)(2)(A)).
59 See generally United States v. Bayer HealthCare Pharms., Inc., No. 1:14-cv31 (D.R.I. Oct. 21, 2019), appeal filed, No. 20-1066 (1st Cir. Jan. 16, 2020); see also
U.S. ex rel. Borzilleri v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-7881, 2019 WL 3203000
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-2947 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 2019); U.S. ex
rel. Health Choice Alliance, LLC v. Eli Lilly and Co., Inc., No. 5:17-cv-123, 2019
WL 4727422 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2019), appeal filed, No. 19-40906 (5th Cir. Oct.
29, 2019).
60 See supra note 10.
61 U.S. ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d
1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998)).
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competitors (the government only intervened in ten).62 These actions all
alleged violations of the Secretary of Agriculture’s orders limiting the
quantity of oranges and lemons that could be shipped into various
markets identified by the Secretary. 63 These allegations claimed that the
defendants had been over-shipping citrus into the regulated markets,
and failed to “report, account and pay assessments for those
overshipments.”64
After Sequoia’s filings, turmoil over these orders continued to
65
grow. The Secretary learned of widespread fraud in relation to these
orders, and in June 1993, formally suspended them temporarily to
gather proposed amendments from citrus industry growers and
packinghouses.66 In tandem with the suspension, the government sought
to intervene in Sequoia’s twenty-four actions it had previously declined
to intervene in, in an effort to settle all FCA cases tied to the citrus
marketing orders.67 The District Court below granted the dismissals,
adopting a two-step analysis: first requiring the identification of a “valid
governmental purpose,”68 and next explaining a rational relation
between the dismissal and effectuating the purpose.69 The District Court
ultimately found the governments reasons compelling for dismissal,
finding that the government had a rational reason for the motion in
furtherance of its legitimate interest to ending all controversy over their
citrus marketing program.70
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit heard the relator’s arguments
alleging that the district court erred in applying the rational relation
standard.71 Further alleging that the government had not proven that its
62

Id.
Id. at 1141–42.
64 Id. at 1142.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67
Id.
68 Id. at 1145.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1146
63
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dismissal was rationally related to a legitimate interest. 72 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the lower court in finding the government had met its
burden.73
The Ninth Circuit explained that the government had a
legitimate interest in dismissing the litigation because it “deemed
further FCA litigation over FCA litigation over prorate violations
harmful to the industry as a whole.” 74 Further, that dismissal was
appropriate by allowing the government to treat all prorate violations
equally through their dismissal. 75 In its holding, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the rational relation test was appropriate in §
3730(c)(2)(A) litigation (albeit without explaining why this standard
was appropriate).76
In Sequoia, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal court of
appeals to interpret this dismissal standard, and did so in a strikingly
brief, conclusory opinion. The rationally related standard for
government dismissals is problematic for a few reasons. First, there is
nothing in the text of the FCA that would lead to such a conclusion. 77
By adopting this standard, the court is overstepping the plain text of the
statute by imposing an additional burden on the government to articulate
their decision-making process—opposed to the discretion of Congress
in granting the government prosecutorial discretion over FCA cases. 78
B. SWIFT V. UNITED STATES
Five years after Sequoia, the issue of § 3730(c)(2)(A) dismissals
once again reached the federal appellate courts, this time in the D.C.
72

Id.
Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1147.
77 See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3730
78 See U.S. ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 756 (9th Cir.1993) (holding
that the FCA grants the judiciary approval authority over government dismissals
under § 3730I(2)(A).
73
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Circuit.79 This case arose from a DOJ employee attorney filing a qui
tam action alleging that a different employee and two former DOJ
employees conspired to present false time sheets and leave slips to the
government, totaling $6169.20. 80 About three months later, the
government moved to dismiss the action, claiming that the amount of
money involved did not justify the expense of litigation—even if the
allegations could be proven. 81 The relator opposed the motion and
sought a rehearing as well as leave to engage in discovery in relation to
government policies on qui tam dismissals.82 Additionally, the relator
moved for the court to unseal the record to help in gathering
information.83 The district court offered a hearing for the relator, but
denied all of her motions. 84 Soon after, the court dismissed the
complaint on the basis that the government had demonstrated that the
dismissal was rationally related to a valid government purpose.85
The relator raised a few issues on appeal including: (1) the
government must move to intervene prior to dismissal; and (2) the court
erred in dismissing the suit because the government did not investigate
her claims.86
Looking to the first issue, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found
that a motion to intervene need not precede a motion to dismiss.87 The
court looks to § 3730(b)(2) for its analysis, which requires the
government to (after the statutory sixty-day period) “proceed with the
action ... or notify the court that it declines to take over the action.”88

79

See generally Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 251.
83 Id.
84
Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
80
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The court interpreted this provision to say that intervention is only
necessary where the government wishes to proceed in the action. 89
Looking to the second issue, the court disagreed with the Sequoia
standard and instead adopts the standard that the government has an
“unfettered right” to dismissing FCA claims. 90 The court reached this
holding upon analyzing the text of § 3730(c)(2)(A) and finding that it
does not give the judiciary any oversight over the judgment of the
Executive.91 The court reads the text very literally, finding that the text
reading “[t]he Government may dismiss the action” explicitly omits the
judiciary from any sort of weight in the analysis.92 The court bolstered
this claim by looking to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
41(a)(1)(i).93 This rule allows for any plaintiff to dismiss a civil action
without leave of court prior to the adverse parties’ filing an answer or
motion for summary judgment.94
Additionally, the court read the hearing requirement of
§ 3730(c)(2)(A) simply is utilized as a means for the relator to convince
the government not to dismiss the case. 95 The court distinguished its
reasoning from Sequoia in explaining that the Senate Report relied upon
by the Ninth Circuit was in relation to an unenacted version of the FCA,
and as such should not be considered in this analysis. 96
Because the court found that the government has an unfettered right
to dismiss an FCA claim (and because it was raised prior to the
defendant’s answer), the court affirmed the lower decision. 97
C. Key Differences between Sequoia and Swift

89

Id.
Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93
Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 253.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 254.
90
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As discussed above, courts following the Sequoia98 standard
analyze whether the government had a rational reason for dismissing
the actions, whereas in Swift, the court found that the government has
an unfettered right to dismiss an FCA claim. 99 These two standards
differ in how much deference they give each party. Under the Sequoia
standard, the court is placing a burden on the government through
mandating it to provide a rational reason for the dismissal. 100 This may
not seem like a great burden, but there are many reasons that the
government would want to keep their decisions held closely and not
disclosed for the public.101
Specifically, the third rationale proposed in the Granston memo
involves the “preventing [of] interference with agency policies and
programs.”102 Situations may be hypothesized where the government
wouldn’t want a qui tam action to interfere with its operations.
For example, imagine that the government is conducting a multiyear investigation on a suspect in State A, building its case as it collects
enough evidence to indict her. Should a relator in State B file a qui tam
action against the same suspect alleging the same fraud the government
has spent years investigating? The government would surely move to
dismiss the action so that is would not ruin their investigation (that
would likely recover more falsely claimed money than the relator). If a
court were to employ the Sequoia standard, the government will likely
have to share with the court their intentions to litigate against the
suspect. This sort of action risks putting the suspect on notice of the
investigation, cutting against the FCA’s purpose in potentially shielding
a fraudster.
Additionally, the Sequoia standard is flawed in requiring the
government to have a rational basis for dismissing a qui tam action that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would not require from any other
98

U.S. ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d
1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998)).
99 Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
100 Sequoia, 151 F.3d at 1141.
101 See generally GRANSTON MEMO
102 Id.
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plaintiff.103 At early stages in trial, a plaintiff is able to dismiss their filed
action without leave, and by requiring the government to prove a
rational basis for dismissal, the courts would be applying a burden on
the government that does not exist in the FCA or FRCP.
While less problematic than the Sequoia Standard, the Swift
Standard also does not align closely with the text and purpose of the
FCA. This standard recognizes that the government is the true injured
party, and as such, grants them more deference than the relators. While
Swift comments that it may not extend past the answer/summary
judgment stage of litigation, it does not offer a suggestion of how to
handle any disputes that arise over a dismissal in that context.
The Swift standard also presents an issue in relation to the hearing
requirement set forth in the FCA. With the unfettered tight to dismiss
any FCA claim, a relator objecting to a motion to dismiss would have
an inconsequential hearing to plead their case. While Swift argues that
the hearing is “just a formal opportunity to convince the government not
to end the case,”104 this likely cuts against Congress’ intent in including
a hearing provision for the motion.105
Understanding that neither standard is proper under the FCA’s text
and history, the Seventh Circuit created a hybrid of the two tests in its
holding of UCB.106
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT APPROACH
A. United States v. UCB
The Seventh Circuit was the next circuit to reach the issue of
government dismissal.107 In this case, a relator initiated an FCA qui tam
103

FRCP Rule 41(a)(1)(i) (permitting a plaintiff to dismiss a complaint without
court approval if the other party has not filed an answer or motion for summary
judgment).
104 Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
105 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
106 See generally U.S. ex rel CIMZNHCA, LLC v UCB, Inc., 970 F.3d.
107 Id.
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action alleging that a pharmaceutical company, UCB, illegally paid
physicians across the nation with free education services and free
assistance with insurance paperwork in return for prescribing its drug,
Cimzia.108 The relator alleged that the scheme on its face would violate
the federal Anti-Kickback Statute,109 and further, when a patient is part
of a federal healthcare program, 110 the FCA would also be violated
because the government would have paid fraudulent reimbursements.111
Over a year after the qui tam suit was filed, the government
moved to dismiss the case against the defendant without any previous
intervention.112 The government expressed that they found the relator’s
claims to “lack sufficient merit” and should not proceed. 113 On hearing
the motion, the district court applied the Sequoia standard and found
that the dismissal was not rationally related to the government’s
purported purpose, and therefore the action should proceed.114 The
government appealed this decision. 115
In choosing to apply Sequoia instead of Swift, the district court
looked to the plain text of the FCA. § 3730(c)(2)(A) of the Act provides
that once a qui tam suit is filed, the government has the right to
“intervene and proceed” as the plaintiff in place of the relator that filed
the action.116 The court determined that an intervention requiring a
hearing would be “[a] hollow ritual” if the court applied Swift, granting
the government an unfettered right to dismiss the case over the relator’s

108

Id. at 839.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(g) (prohibiting giving or receiving items or services
in return for referring an individual’s medicine or treatment).
110 42 C.F.R. § 1000.10 (defining federal healthcare programs as “any plan or
program that provides health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or
otherwise, which is funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United States
Government”).
111 UCB, 970 F.3d at 839.
112
Id. at 840.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 853.
115 Id.
116 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
109
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objections.117 The court reasoned that because the relator must have
some grounds to defend the objection in a hearing, it chose to apply the
Sequoia standard, and again, found that the government did not meet its
burden in proving that it had a rational basis for dismissing the action. 118
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit panel began its § 3730(c)(2)(A)
analysis by looking to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under
FRCP Rule 41(a)(1)(B), a plaintiff may dismiss an action by filing a
notice of dismissal at any time before the defendant files an answer or
motion for summary judgment. 119 The court quoted one of its former
opinions in commenting that “one doesn’t need a good reason, or even
a sane or any reason” to dismiss a case under this rule.120 However, the
court continued to hold that where the defendant has already filed an
answer or motion for summary judgment, Rule 41(a)(2) would instead
apply, allowing “an action [to] be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request
only by court order.”121
In applying these rules to the FCA, the court found that in
situations where Rule 41(a)(1)(B) applies, the government has an
unfettered right to dismiss the lawsuit. 122 Further, the court found that
in situations where Rule 41(a)(2) applies, the court has the discretion to
determine whether the government has a rational reason for dismissing
the action.123
The court went on to comment that when viewing these rules
considering the Sequoia standard, the two cannot coexist. 124 With
Sequoia, applying the rational relation test before an answer or motion
for summary judgment has been imposed therefore raises the bar for the
government above what a standard plaintiff may have to experience.

117

Id.
Id.
119 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B).
120
UCB, 970 F.3d. at 851.
121 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).
122 UCB, 970 F.3d. at 851.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 852.
118
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However, if applying Swift after an answer or motion for summary
judgment has been filed, the rules would also be violated. 125
Seeing this oversight, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the lower
court’s issue with the hearing requirement, and instead crafted a rule in
stating that during the initial stages of litigation grant the government
an unfettered right to dismiss like Swift, and after an answer or motion
for summary judgment is filed, the standard flips to the rational relation
test, like Sequoia.126
B. Issues with the UCB Holding
With UCB, the Seventh Circuit has created the dismissal rule
closest to the text and purpose of the False Claims Act. By changing the
standard depending on the stage of litigation, this approach provides for
the most equitable division of control of the three different dismissal
standards. This rule makes a lot of logical sense, the government retains
full control to dismiss the action up until the moment a defendant files
an answer or motion for summary judgment. The early-stage dismissal
causes little to no harm to the parties, where a later stage dismissal has
the potential to and therefore should have a rational reason for it.
While this standard is logical, it still fails to meet the full purpose
of the FCA. Under the UCB approach, the government’s burden to
prove that the requested dismissal is rationally related to a legitimate
interest can lead to problematic results. The government is often in a
position of having more information than a relator,127 and in scenarios
where they have been investigating an individual that was sued by a
relator, the government must have the express authority to dismiss the
case to protect the public. By being compelled to share its motives to
the court, a relator could ruin years of investigatory efforts because they
believe that they deserve a share of the reward.

125

Id.
Id. at 853.
127 See generally GRANSTON MEMO
126
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Relator’s are intended to provide helpful information to the
government and lend support where the government is unable. 128 When
a relator disagrees with a government dismissal of their qui tam action,
they are fighting to protect their interest in litigation that they both
inserted themselves into and were not harmed.
When the government seeks dismissal of a case, it should be
presumed to have effectuated the due diligence needed from a rational
relation standard. The government has a privacy interest in many of its
dealings, and if a relator comes to stand between it and its litigation, the
relator should not be the party that prevails. The government, as the true
injured party, should be afforded significant deference in these cases.
However, because the need for beneficial qui tam relators is so great, a
balance needs to be struck that allows for protection of relators while
valuing the governments interests appropriately.
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
In looking forward, it would be helpful for Congress to propose an
amendment in relation to this provision that would clear up their intent
for the dismissal standards. The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied
hearing this issue, and Congress is in the best position to make a
clarification due to its extensive history with the Act. Without Congress
and the Supreme Court, the lower courts are left at odds with one
another, causing significant problems to the government in its pursuit of
justice.
A potential solution has been offered by a scholar at the University
of Chicago Law School.129 This note suggests that the best solution to
this issue involves treating the government-relator relationship similar
to the board-shareholder relationships in Corporate Law.130 Under this
128

See Rich, supra note 26, at 1266 (“[T]he relator recovery structure of the
FCA is intended to encourage whistleblowers to come forward with helpful
information.”).
129 THE EXECUTIVE JUDGMENT RULE: A NEW STANDARD OF
DISMISSAL FOR QUI TAM SUITS UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, 87 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1051 (2020)
130 Id. at 1088.
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approach, a modified rule close to the Seventh Circuit’s is offered.
However, it is distinguishable in shifting the burden of proof to the
relator to show that the government performed some misstep in their
investigative process rather than making the government prove its
motives.131 The offered rule would act similarly to the Business
Judgment Rule, protecting board members from liability from
substantive decisions absent conduct that is arbitrary and capricious. 132
Under this approach, the government retains its control over the case
absent a lack of due diligence, protecting the relator’s interest against
an unwarranted dismissal.
This proposed rule balances the interests of the relators and the
government alike. The government will remain to have its substantive
decisions protected, protecting the privacy it needs to operate
efficiently. Similarly, relators would be satisfied because there would be
recourse for them should the government conduct themselves
inappropriately and provides a proper issue for a § 3730(c)(2)(A)
hearing: whether the government conducted its investigation with due
diligence.
CONCLUSION
With fraudulent activity on the rise, 133 it is now more important
than ever to ensure that whistleblowers remain incentivized to turn over
valuable information to the government. While the relator’s role is
important in qui tam actions, it is more important that the government
retains its privacy that may be extinguished due to a relator’s FCA
action. Congress could solve this dismissal issue by amending
§ 3730(c)(2)(B) to include language allowing for government dismissal
after the answer/summary judgment stage so long as they conducted
their investigations thoroughly. While relators have an important role to
play in FCA litigation, their interest in the litigation cannot supersede
that of the true injured party.
131

Id.
Id.at 1078.
133 See supra note 17.
132
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